P R O C E E D I N G S
Whereupon,
I. LEWIS LIBBY
was called as a witness and, after first being duly sworn by
the Foreperson of the Grand Jury, was examined and testified
as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Libby.
A. Good morning.
Q. And we're going to go — the first break will be at
10:45, but if you need a break sooner than that, let us know.
I'd just like to briefly re-advise you of all your
constitutional rights, which is that, again, you have the
right to refuse to answer any question to which a truthful
answer would tend to incriminate you. Do you understand that
right? You just have to say yes or no.
A. Oh, yes, sir. I'm sorry. Yes, sir.
Q. And secondly, obviously even though you answered
questions the last time, you still have the right to refuse to
answer questions this time or change your mind at any time.
Do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And obviously, you still have a right to counsel.
And in fact, you are represented by Mr. Tate, the same
attorney as last time. Correct?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. And you understand that you have a right to ask for
a reasonable break, to step out of the room and consult with
Mr. Tate if you'd like. Correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also understand that your testimony is under
oath and further that based upon your conduct, in particular
contact with reporters, your conduct is the subject of
investigation by this Grand Jury, as it was last time. Do you
understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And as we confirmed prior to you appearing —
reappearing here this morning with your attorney, you remain
the same status as a subject. You understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And are you ready to proceed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And is it fair to say, sir, that following
your last Grand Jury appearance which I believe was March 5th
of this year, just earlier this month, that you had a
conversation with your attorney and relayed to your attorney
that there were certain things that you wanted to correct or
amend following your testimony?
A. Yes, sir. I had additional recollections based on
some of the questions you asked me.
Q. And is it your understanding that your attorney then
called me and told — advised me, my office, that in fact you
had two things you wanted to clarify, and that again this
morning we met briefly and you clarified those two matters?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And now what I'd simply like to do is forget
you talked to me before and just explain to the Grand Jury the
two different areas you wanted to clarify.
A. Yes, sir. You asked me about conversations with
Undersecretary Marc Grossman, and at the time I couldn't
remember any such discussion because I was trying to remember
a serious discussion with him about this topic. One of your
questions though had to do with whether I thought State had
sent Under — had sent Ambassador Wilson on this mission which
was so far off the mark in terms of what I thought at the time
that it stuck in my mind and I couldn't think about how — I
couldn't understand how that misunderstanding could come
about. And then I — in the middle of the night I remembered
that I had joked with Undersecretary Grossman about this, not
a serious discussion but a joke, and I can relay for you, if
you wish, how that joke came about and what it was.
Q. Sure.
A. Ribbing is probably a better word.
Q. Okay.
A. In the — I have to go back in times to — so that
you understand how it began. In, in the summer of 2002,
before President Bush went to the U.N. and challenged the U.N.
to respond seriously to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and
his unwillingness to — at that point admit inspectors and
abide by his obligation to turn over weapons of mass
destruction, there was a debate within the interagency,
meaning State Department, Pentagon, White House, about what,
what type of resolution — what resolution and what type of
resolution we would need from the U.N. And one of the issues
was if we were going to go the U.N. and ask the U.N. to get
inspectors to Iraq readmitted, what sort of rights would we
need? And the Vice President asked me to get the interagency
together to determine, if you're going to go into Iraq and
inspect for weapons, as difficult as that is, what is — what
are the rights that you would want, what are the authorities
you would want the inspectors, the U.N. inspectors, to have,
to have a reasonable shot at finding something given how
difficult it would be since he had hidden all his weapons.
This was the belief, the understanding at the time, that he
had made great efforts to hide things.
So I went to the interagency, to the NSC, and they
went out to the interagency and said, we would like to get a
study going of what are the types of rights you would need if
you were a U.N. inspector. What would you most want to have
if you could have the best set of rights you could possibly
have? I received word back from some people on the NSC that
Undersecretary Grossman had refused to participate, and he —
his view was that we couldn't get an ideal set of rights and
that he told the NSC that I was asking for this solely in an
attempt to get a long list that couldn't be achieved and then
to leak it, give it to the press to embarrass Secretary
Powell. That was not true and it was not why the Vice
President had asked me to go develop this list. It was in
order to get the best possible rights for the U.N. But it was
bothersome that he was not only not just calling me and
saying, hey, what's this about, but talking to people in the
NSC and accusing us, in effect, of, of putting this request in
bad faith when it was a request in good faith to find out what
does the U.N. need.
Eventually we went ahead with the study as best we
could. The State Department participated only up to the point
of what they thought the Secretary was likely to get, or
something like that.
That was, as I said, the fall of '02. Now, let me
skip forward to spring, or whenever it was that we were — I
was in the SIT room. I recall now being in the SIT room with
Undersecretary Grossman. We were waiting for a DC to begin,
or we were waiting for them to change out between an old one
and a new one.
Q. Let me just stop you there. When you say "DC", do
you mean Deputies Committee Meeting?
A. I'm sorry, yes, sir.
Q. Okay.
A. A Deputies Committee. And we were standing there
and just waiting for it to go. And I — to fill the time, I
ribbed Undersecretary Grossman by saying something like this
guy who went out to Niger was one of yours. And he smiled and
said, no, not one of ours, one of theirs, and pointed down the
table towards where the CIA officer usually sits in the
Interagency Meeting. And I said, but he was an ambassador,
meaning he was, you know, formerly at least at one point a
State Department person, and I was ribbing him about basically
that a State Department person had been leaking something when
he had been nine months before accusing us. And then, then I
said something about it's a, it's a sad state of affairs when
the CIA — again, this was another ribbing again or — it's a
sad state of affairs when the CIA has to get their own
ambassador to send to a country to ask questions about what
our embassy could be asking about, in effect. Again, it was
just a joke. And Grossman — Undersecretary Grossman said
something or other. The ambassador in Niger was a woman. I
don't recall her name. But I said something else to him,
like, did she know that he had been sent out there, or
something like that. And that's what I recall from the, from
the conversation. It was mostly, you know, filling time
getting ready for another meeting, and none of it was I
thinking of a serious discussion since the one thing that was
clear was that the CIA had sent, had sent this ambassador out
there. So that was my — that's my recollection.
Q. Do you know when this was in terms of the — there
was a Pincus article that came out on May 6th, and which
referred to a former ambassador, but not by name. And then
later on there was a June 12th Pincus article. Do you know
where in this time frame this, this conversation would have
occurred with Undersecretary Grossman?
A. I don't. I think it was a Kristof article on May
6th. You may have —
Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. I meant to say Kristof.
A. I don't know, I thought you said Pincus. But in any
case, the May 6th article referred to an ambassador. I don't
recall, I don't recall where it was. I, I remember that it
was a session and standing next to him in the SIT room.
Q. Would you place this conversation in May or June as
opposed to July of 2003? And, and I mis-spoke. It was
Kristof in May and Pincus on June 12th, and obviously you had
the Wilson op-ed on July 6th. Do you know if it was before or
after Wilson himself had come out by name?
A. I think it was before Wilson had come out. I think
it was in the first half of June I would say.
Q. And was this a single conversation with Mr. Grossman
about this?
A. Yes, that's all I remember.
Q. Do you know if you ever had a conversation about the
topic of this ambassador, whether you mentioned his name as
Wilson or not, where you asked him to find something out and
then he got back to you?
A. No. No, I don't remember anything about that. And
I don't think I mentioned his name in that conversation
because I don't think I knew it at that point.
Q. And was there any discussion during that
conversation as you recall it about whether or not this
ambassador's wife had worked at the CIA?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. And when you had this conversation how did Mr.
Grossman appear to take your comment? Seriously or lightly?
A. I thought he understood it lightly.
Q. And is that the only conversation you recall about
the topic of the ambassador traveling to Niger with Mr.
Grossman during May, June and July of 2003?
A. It's the only one that I recall, yeah.
Q. So we're clear, you had no conversation with Mr.
Grossman ever telling you that the ambassador had a wife who
worked at the CIA, at any time?
A. I don't recall him ever telling me that.
Q. Now, you also — there was a second part of your
testimony you wanted to clarify or amplify?
A. Yes. You asked me about a lunch with Ari Fleischer
on July 7, the day after Ambassador Wilson's column came out.
And you also asked me about the gaggle in the morning, and I
had sort of forgotten that our lunch followed the morning — a
morning gaggle where he had made points about the Vice
President. And I recall that somewhere in the course of that
lunch, the first portion of it, as I recall, I thanked him for
having covered the points in the gaggle, so I did discuss that
part of it.
Q. Okay. And is it still your recollection that you
also discussed his future employment at that time, on July
7th —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. — with Ari Fleischer?
A. Yeah.
Q. And that you discussed the Miami Dolphins with Ari
Fleischer on July 7?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Still no recollection at all of ever discussing the
fact that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA with Mr. Fleischer?
A. I don't think so, sir. I have no more — I hade no
more recollection after our discussion. The only thing that I
recalled anew was the bit about the gaggle.
Q. You have no recollection of ever telling Mr.
Fleischer that this is either hush-hush, or Q.t. or words to
that effect, that Wilson's wife works out at the CIA?
A. No, sir, I don't.
Q. And no discussion that you recall where either one
of you implied with Wilson had obtained the assignment to go
to Niger as a result of perceived nepotism?
A. No, sir, not that I recall.
Q. And — now, you also testified — well, let me go
back to June 6th, and we did not ask you about this last time,
but your calendar reflected that you had a meeting on June 6th
with Richard Armitage. And do you recall if you ever
discussed the topic of Mr. Wilson's wife's employment at the
CIA with Richard Armitage?
A. Is this June 6th a meeting at the State Department
with him?
Q. I'm not sure where the meeting was. And forget the
June 6th date. Did you at any time ever discuss Wilson's
wife's employment with Mr. Armitage?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. And how close are you to Mr. Armitage?
A. I mean, I see him a lot. I'm not that — you know,
we don't, we don't go out socially, but I see him in DCs,
Deputies Committee meetings, once every couple weeks. For a
while it was more frequent but we don't go as much as we used
to.
Q. And how long have you known Mr. Armitage?
A. I've known him for years, 1982, 1983, 1984 I knew
him.
Q. Did you represent Mr. Armitage at one time?
A. I did, when I was practicing law I represented him
with regard to a libel matter, he was being libeled.
Q. Would that be in or about 1989? Was that a dispute
with Ross Perot on something?
A. Yes, it was. The libel was separate from Ross
Perot. Yes, there was also a dispute in that same time period
with Ross Perot. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know if there ever came a time if you
ever discussed with Mr. Armitage any outstanding requests for
information with — from, from Mr. Grossman when Mr. Grossman
was on vacation?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. And do you recall in the June time frame ever
receiving a document from the White House Situation Room, a
fax that was to be hand-delivered to you and to John Hannah
which contained a document that the CIA had prepared in
earlier 2003? Does that ring a bell with you at all?
A. I don't know about the Hannah being on a document.
I did receive documents from the CIA, you know, that came
through the SIT room, and those — if I retained them, they
would be in my documents.
Q. Okay. And by the way, I think that's the first time
I mentioned the name John Hannah. Can you tell us what John
Hannah's role is in the Office of Vice President?
A. John Hannah works in the National Security Affairs
Office of the Office of the Vice President, and he's a
specialist on greater Middle Eastern Affairs.
Q. Okay. And in the reporting chain, who does he
report to?
A. He reports to my Deputy and then to me, I suppose.
Q. And who — what's the name of your Deputy that Mr.
Hannah reports to?
A. It varied. Prior to June of '03 it was Eric
Edelman, now Ambassador, Ambassador Eric Edelman. And since
about that time Toria Nuland is my new Deputy.
Q. How would you spell —
A. Victoria.
Q. Oh, Victoria?
A. Victoria Nuland.
Q. Okay.
A. Nuland is N-u-l-a-n-d; Victoria is the traditional
spelling.
Q. Okay. And why don't I show you some documents
that — what we'll do is we won't mark them as exhibits.
We'll refer to the Bates Stamp Numbers so we have it for the
record, but this way we can deal with declassification issues
at a later time.
A. Okay. And they will be a series beginning 1456
forward, Katie, which would include page 1538, 1552. Okay,
show you a document.
MS. KEDIAN. 1538.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. Let me start with 1456. In the meantime, I'll show
you 1445. Let me show you what's a document — it's Bates
Stamped 1445 and without getting into the contents it's from,
from John Hannah to the Vice President and concerning a CIA
paper on the Iraq/Niger/uranium deal. Do you recognize that?
A. I do, sir.
Q. Okay. And do you recall receiving it on or about
June 9th?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you recall what it was that occasioned Mr.
Hannah to prepare this?
A. We had gotten a paper from the CIA. It was a very
long paper. I think it's attached here, eight single-spaced
pages with a lot of data in it, and a lot of dates and
meetings and discussions, and he undertook to summarize some
of the things that were in the CIA paper down to, I guess, two
and a half pages.
Q. Okay. And looking at page 1449, does that appear to
be a cover sheet of what the CIA transmitted to Congress in
April, 2003, regarding Iraq and Niger, and then the document
you described as an eight-page single-spaced document followed
behind it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then the document that Mr. Hannah prepared is a
summary of what was contained in the transmission from CIA to
Congress which included the eight page single-spaced
statement?
A. Yes, sir. This was a document not, not prepared for
us, but one they had prepared for Congress and we were getting
a copy of it.
Q. Right. So in, in early 2003, and specifically on
the date reflected on page 1449, April 3rd, the CIA gives
something to Congress, and if you look at the fax header on
1449 and 1450 it sounds like on June 9th you get a copy sent,
and the fax header seems to come from the Op Center to the
Vice President's Office, and then John Hannah, on June 9th
prepares this summary of the document?
A. I don't see the fax cover. I don't know what —
Q. We'll, we'll produce that later, I think. But
there's a June 9th fax sheet that says —
A. Okay.
Q. — please hand-deliver to yourself and Mr. Hannah.
So in other words, this was not something you received, to
your knowledge, in March when it was sent to Congress, this
was something you received on June 9th?
A. I did not — my, my recollection is I did not
receive it when it went to, to Congress.
Q. Let me show you a transmittal sheet. Actually,
that's a three page one — we'll show you — okay. If looking
at page 1450 — the handwriting on page 1456, the upper left
corner. Does that read, "Did CIA have it in their document?"
The handwriting?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whose hand — whose printing that is?
A. I, I don't. It could be Hannah, but I don't know.
Q. Okay. Now, once Mr. Hannah prepared the summary
memo and attached the CIA memo from earlier that year, what
happened with this document? Were there any meetings
concerning it or discussions that you attended?
A. I don't recall any meetings about — specifically
about the document. I recall reading the document and
referring to it subsequently when I was, you know, talking
about this issue.
Q. Okay. And when you say subsequently, when would
that be?
A. In, in the weeks and months that followed as we were
looking at the uranium issue. There was some interest —
there were some interesting in points that I didn't know.
Q. Okay. And showing you what we'll mark by the Bates
Stamp Numbers 1472, does that appear to be a cover sheet —
A. Yes.
Q. — for Monday, June 9th, 2003?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. To Jenny Mayfield. And does it say, "Please pass to
Mr. Hannah and Mr. Libby ASAP?"
A. Yes.
Q. And does that appear to include the CIA transmittal
sheet to Congress from earlier that year, and then that eight
page document you referenced?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know if you discussed this with the Vice
President on or about June 9th when this was prepared?
A. I did discuss points in that memorandum with the
Vice President. I don't recall exactly when it was.
Q. Okay. And do you know if you discussed the identity
of the envoy who had gone from — who had been sent from the
United States, or the source, who had gone to Niger in 2002 to
investigate the yellowcake claims with Vice President?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you know when you discussed that?
A. At various times it was discussed. I don't know if
it came up specifically with regard to this fax or not. The
fax refers to the envoy having gone in a paragraph, in the
course of the eight pages they talk about it, but I don't
recall whether this occasioned one of the discussions about,
you know, who is this envoy and how did he come to be sent and
that sort of thing.
Q. Okay. Let me show you a different but similar
document that is Bates Stamped 1537 in the lower right corner.
And do you recognize that document?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And what is this document?
A. I'm not as familiar with this document as I am with
this one. I studied this one more closely than this document.
I think I recognize this document from having seen something
like it in my files. There's a writing at the top which says,
"prepared by CIA," and I haven't read it just sitting here. I
don't recall when I last read it, if I ever read it fully, but
I see that it looks to be sort of like the document that you
showed me before where they're going through paragraph by
paragraph, different chronological events seemingly in order,
chronological order.
Q. And on 1537 there's handwriting that says, "prepared
by CIA" in the upper right corner, "received July 12th, '03,"
do you know whose handwriting that is?
A. I don't. It looks a little bit like the Vice
President's but I don't know whose handwriting it is.
Q. Okay. And if you turn to the second page, page
1538, and next to paragraph number six there's a handwriting
that says, "Wilson" with an underlining and a question mark.
And do you know whose handwriting that is?
A. I, I don't. Again, it might be the Vice President's
but I'm not sure.
Q. And looking at the cover sheet that had shown on
June 9th that said, "please pass to Mr. Hannah and Mr. Libby
ASAP," do you know if there's a particular event on June 9th
which I — which I'm referring to 1472, I've taken that away
from you. Seeing that the CIA sent a document over to the
office ASAP on June 9th, Mr. Hannah the same day prepared a
summary, do you know what it was that occasioned this ASAP
delivery of this CIA report of uranium and Niger?
A. I, I do not know. It is around the time that we
were doing the Pincus article, you know, preparing to talk to
Pincus, so it could be in relation to that, or it could just
be an inquiry, but I don't know. ASAP is not a particularly,
you know, hair on fire type marking, but I don't, I don't
know.
Q. You understand ASAP stands for "as soon as
possible"?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And whatever time it got to — over to the —
it says it was delivered at — it appears to be June 9, 2003.
I don't know if it has a — it doesn't appear to have a time.
A. It says 9:00 p.m. —
Q. At 9:00 p.m. And then the memo from John Hannah
that describes the information, CIA paper, and referring to
page 1445 again, is dated June 9th, 2003. And that would be a
two and a half page summary. So if in fact it got to — over
to the office at 9:00 p.m. on a Monday night in June, if Mr.
Hannah dated it correctly, he created a summary sometime
thereafter. So —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was during the time frame when you were
talking with the Vice President and others about how to
respond to Mr. Pincus' inquiries for an article he would
eventually publish on June 12th. Correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at the time did you know the name of the envoy
who had gone to Niger as being Mr. Wilson?
A. No, sir. Not the best I recall.
Q. And looking at — if we could pull out 1552. And do
you recall if you had a meeting, sat down with Vice President
Cheney and with Mr. Hannah concerning this between June 9th
and the time you spoke to Mr. Pincus?
A. I don't recall.
Q. And let me show you what's been marked as Bates
Stamps 1552, 1553. And again, we'll just mark it for the
record without admitting it so we can deal with classification
issues later. Is that a CIA cable concerning the trip that
Ambassador Wilson took to Niger —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. — in 2002? And is there handwriting on the first
page?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And does it say the word "Wilson"?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know whose handwriting that is?
A. Again, it looks to me like it might be the Vice
President's.
Q. And do you recall ever discussing this cable with
the Vice President where he would have written down the name
Wilson?
A. I recall discussing the cable with the Vice
President. I don't recall him having written the name Wilson
on the cable while we talked about it, if that's what the —
if that's what your question means. I recall discussing the
Wilson cable, cable about Mr. — Ambassador Wilson with him.
Q. And what were the circumstances under which you
discussed the Wilson cable with the Vice President?
A. It probably came up — it came up multiple times.
Part of what came up about it is in this paragraph two which
is underlined by whoever wrote this where they say that Myoki,
the former Nigerian Prime Minister, related that an Iraqi
delegation had tried to make contact with the government of
Niger to open discussions for, I think what's called
"commercial relations" in here, which they understood to mean
uranium. You know, they don't make C.D. players in Niger.
"Commercial relations" was meant — they understood to mean to
purchase uranium.
Q. And so is it fair to say when the allegations came
out in the Kristof column and later in the Wilson piece, that
Wilson's trip had sort of debunked the sixteen words contained
in the State of the Union that one of the points the Vice
President and yourself wanted to make was that you believed
that Wilson's trip had sort of corroborated the sixteen words
to the extent that he had reported back that there had been
prior efforts to open commercial — or establish commercial
relations between Iraq and Niger?
A. Yes, sir. That's what we understood the Agency took
this — the Agency took that to mean, and from this it looks
that way to us too.
Q. Let me show you 1588. And is that another copy of a
cable containing information concerning a trip, the trip to
Niger by Ambassador Wilson even if it does not name — even
though it doesn't name Mr. Wilson in the text?
A. Yes, sir. I think it's the same cable, just a
different format.
Q. If you look at 1588, does that have some handwriting
in the upper right corner?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And does that say "Joe Wilson"?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whose handwriting that is?
A. It looks like it could be the Vice President's. I
don't recognize the "J" but, you know, it could be the Vice
President's.
Q. Does the "Wilson" part look like the Vice
President's?
A. It looks more similar to the other writing we've
seen. Yes, sir.
Q. And let me show you what's been marked as 1784 Bates
Stamp. And if you look at 1784, does the text — if you're
looking at the text, does that appear to mirror page two of
the document we've been talking about? And I'll give you a
page to compare it to. Does the text appear to match 1475
which is the page two of that eight page single-spaced
document which the CIA had prepared in March of 2003, shared
with Congress and then was forwarded to the Office of Vice
President on June 9th?
A. Yes, sir. It looks like a different version of the
same thing.
Q. Okay. And does page 1784 in your right hand have
printing and handwriting in the left column?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And does it say "Joe Wilson" in print, and then
underneath "Wilson" in script?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you recognize the printing?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recognize the script?
A. It looks like me.
Q. Okay. And do you know —
A. It looks like my writing.
Q. Looks like — okay, looks like your handwriting.
And the printing, does that look like your printing?
A. Does not.
Q. Okay.
A. It's too neat.
Q. Okay. So it would look like someone else printed
"Joe Wilson" and you handwrote "Wilson" underneath?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And does that look like anyone you
recognize — does the printing look like the printing of
anyone you recognize or familiar with?
A. No, sir —
Q. Okay. Does it look like the printing of either the
Vice President or Cathie Martin, or anyone else you work
closely with?
A. I don't know. We — I don't think it looks like
Cathie Martin, but I'm not really that familiar — we do have
some documents that have her writing on it. It's not mine.
Q. Okay.
A. It's too neat.
Q. So the printing on 1784 is not yours and you don't
know whose it is. The handwriting on 1784, "Wilson" appears
to be you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then the other ones we've shown before say
"Wilson", a number of them look similar and appear that they
could be the Vice President?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. And seeing the various documents and various
iterations with a number of references to "Wilson" or "Joe
Wilson," does that refresh your recollection as to discussions
you may have had in the June time frame with the Vice
President about Mr. Wilson's trip to Niger?
A. Not more than the others. I don't know that the
writing happened — at least my writing happened — I don't
think happened in the June time frame.
Q. How often did you refer back to the June cables to
refresh what was in the cables and make notes as to what it —
you know, about, for example, Wilson?
A. Fairly frequently if I was about to engage about it
with someone. I would have to go look at it, or I would try
to go look at it to make sure that I was fresh on the
document.
Q. And who would you be engaging with that would cause
you to go back and refresh the document?
A. When I was — if I was going to go talk to a
reporter about it, or if I was getting ready to talk to a
reporter about it, about the Wilson trip, or if I was going to
go talk to the Vice President about it or anyone where we're
talking about the substance.
Q. And the last time we showed you a document that you
had dated as approximately June 12th which indicated a
discussion at that time with the Vice President where you
noted that he had indicated to you that the ambassador's wife
had worked at the functional office at the CIA, referred to as
CPD, the Counterproliferation Division. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know if you had reviewed some — any of
these documents, the Wilson cable or the June 9th report, with
Vice President Cheney at or about the time of the conversation
where he told you that the ambassador's wife worked at the
functional office in Counterproliferation?
A. Did I review the CIA document that's dated June 9
and the cover memo?
Q. Yes.
A. I mean, the transmittal dated June 9? Yes, that
would be at or about the time of that note which I was
guessing was some time around June 12. Before June 12
actually.
Q. And is it fair to say that before June 12 there was
a fair amount of discussion of the envoy's trip to Niger and,
and that discussion included the comments you recall where the
Vice President told you that this envoy's wife worked at the
CIA?
A. I'm sorry, I missed it. I didn't get —
Q. There was conversation during the early June time
frame between yourself and the Vice President where you were
discussing this envoy's trip to Niger. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And during that — those conversations you learned
from the Vice President that the envoy's wife worked at the
functional office concerning Counterproliferation at the CIA.
Correct?
A. I think I only learned that in, in one telephone
conversation from — I only had one — that I recall, I only
had one conversation about that point with the Vice President.
It was not a fuller discussion of the substance like this
cable. It was a very short discussion which was relaying to
me something he had learned. So, so not in the course of a
discussion about the cables particularly. It was a short
conversation and I only recall one on that.
Q. And is it fair to say that during the time frame you
were having discussions with the Vice President in preparation
for your speaking to Mr. Pincus who was going to write an
article for the Washington Post?
A. I think that was the discussion prior to my talking
to Pincus.
Q. Okay. And when you say that was the discussion, the
discussion —
A. The one, the one where I wrote the notes that you're
referring to.
Q. Okay. So the conversation reflected in the notes
where the Vice President advised you that the envoy's wife
worked at the CIA in Counterproliferation was a discussion you
had with the Vice President in preparation for your speaking
to Mr. Pincus?
A. Yes. There were two parts to that conversation.
There was a background session and then there were the points
that I was supposed to raise with Pincus. The point about the
wife was in the first part, physically on the paper anyway.
And the points for the — to raise with Pincus were at the
bottom of the page.
Q. And do you recall if your notes distinguished
between background and what to raise with Mr. Pincus when you
wrote them down?
A. Yes, they do to me.
Q. And did you ever have a discussion with Mr. — where
the Vice President told you either that you should or should
not tell Mr. Pincus about the envoy's wife's employment at the
CIA?
A. No.
Q. Did you ask the Vice President whether it was
appropriate if you could tell Mr. Pincus this fact?
A. No.
Q. And is it possible that you told Mr. Pincus that
fact?
A. No, I don't think I did.
Q. You don't recall doing so?
A. I don't recall doing so and I don't — I do not
recall doing so.
Q. And did you understand at the time that you were
legally prohibited from doing so?
A. No.
Q. And the last time we spoke you indicated that you
had a conversation with Judith Miller on July 8th. Is that
fair to say?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. About how long was that conversation?
A. An hour perhaps, maybe, maybe a little over.
Q. And you mentioned that prior to having that
conversation you had a discussion with Vice President Cheney
as to what you could discuss with Judith Miller?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. And can you tell us when you had the conversation
with the Vice President and what concerns you raised, and what
he told you in response?
A. The Vice President and I discussed the need to get
into the public domain that the CIA National Intelligence
Estimate made it clear to recipients of the National
Intelligence Estimate that Iraq had been attempting to procure
uranium. This was similar to the point that the President
raised in the State of the Union in the famous sixteen words.
And despite the fact that there had been a lot of talk about
particular documents having been forged, the Vice President's
point was that the policy makers, he, had seen and had relied
upon the National Intelligence Estimate, which is sort of the
gold standard of the consensus view of all the intelligence
community, that Iraq was attempting to procure uranium. And
he felt that that point should get out because that's what he
understood at the time when the President gave his State of
the Union.
The National Intelligence Estimate was a classified
document at that point. It's a very — it's a long document.
The portion about uranium is short and there's some key
judgments at the front that were short, which are short
compared to the length of the document. And the problem in
letting people know what the National Intelligence Estimate
said on that was that it's a classified document. So we could
not talk to the press about it until it was declassified, and
I discussed that with the Vice President. It was — it's
within the purview of the President, as I understand, and I
was informed by the General Counsel to the Vice President's
Office, that the National Intelligence Estimate, or any other
document that's classified, can be declassified by the
President if he wishes. And so the Vice President thought we
should get some of these facts out to the press, but before it
could be done, the document had to be declassified. I had had
a conversation with David Addington that we talked about in
our last session when he relayed that. He had mentioned to me
a legal case. I had written down the name of the legal case.
I'd forgotten it the first time. I came back to him, had a
second conversation, wrote it down in my notes, reported to
the Vice President. I reconfirmed with David Addington about
this. And he then undertook to get, to get permission from
the President to talk about this to a reporter. He got the
permission. Told me to go off and talk to the reporter. My
recollection is that I did not accomplish it right away, and
he told me at one point to hold up, and then he came back and
said to go ahead. And so at that point I went ahead and
scheduled the meeting and had the discussion.
Q. Okay. Now, can you fix the date when you first
spoke to the Vice President about trying to get the facts out
from the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, and then you
in that conversation expressed your reservations because it
was a classified document?
A. No. I think there were several over a period of
time, none of them being long. It was not a long debate. But
there was several times it was talked about that, you know,
the NIE was clear, this cable was actually not persuasive even
to Director Tenet or the CIA as Director Tenet made clear in
his July 11th statement. When the entire NIE was
declassified, these portions of the NIE were declassified by
the Agency and then provided to the press on July 18, it was
clear from that text that it was all declassified. So there
were discussions about that. There were discussions about
getting the Agency to declassify it separately. There were
discussions with the Vice President all — for some time as I
recall. But again, not, not developed discussions. It was a
point that, you know, it would be good to have this out, but
it would have to be declassified. And I can't give you a
precise date for those.
Q. Okay. Let's walk backwards. July 18th was the date
that it became publicly available and declassified, is it your
understanding, of the NIE?
A. It became — these sections. Not the entire NIE.
Sections — the CIA declassified sections of the NIE in
advance of July 18. On July 18 it was passed out, I think.
So some time before that, the CIA did. The President had
already declassified some of it.
Q. And, and when you say the President had already
declassified it, you're referring to what you had been told by
Vice President Cheney as to the fact that the President gave
you permission to talk about parts of the NIE with Judith
Miller?
A. Yes, sir. I don't think the President knew Judith
Miller, but the — with, with the press. Yes, sir.
Q. And did the Vice President know Judith Miller at the
time he authorized you to discuss it?
A. Yes, I think — at one of the — before the final —
before I actually went and talked to Judith Miller I think he
knew it was Judith Miller I was going to talk to. Yes, sir.
Q. Focusing on your meeting on July 8th with Judith
Miller. How long before — was that a conversation you had
the day before with the Vice President where he asked you to
share the — some of the relevant materials from the NIE and
then you brought to his attention the classification issue?
A. There was a discussion with him the day before,
roughly the day before. It was not the first time we had
discussed the declassification issue, and I think by that
point the declassification issue, I think, was resolved. But,
but — if, if that's complete.
Q. Okay. When was it — was Judith Miller the first
reporter you, you discussed the NIE with?
A. The first reporter that I discussed the text of the
NIE with. Con — National Security Advisor Rice in mid-June
or so had been talking about the NIE having statements about,
you know, that it was the source and it was, you know, it was
clear that Iraq was seeking uranium or something like that.
She had been discussing that in June to the press and it was
reported in the press about the NIE. In terms of the first
discussion I ever had about, you know, the language of the
text, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And the only, I think —
Q. Okay.
A. — prior to after the 18th.
Q. Okay. And with, with — was it your understanding
that you would show the text of the relevant portions of the
NIE to Judith Miller when you discussed it with the Vice
President?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you in fact show those relevant portions of
the text?
A. Talked it through with her and I think I gave it to
her, showed it to her, an excerpt.
Q. Okay. And when you showed it to her did you let her
read the relevant portions of the whole document or did you
have a redacted version?
A. Oh, no, redacted.
Q. And did she get to keep the redacted copy?
A. I think I gave her a page which had bullets from it,
not a xerox of it but bullets of it, I think, where it was
redacted and I think, I think what I showed her had country
names omitted. It was less than what I had been authorized to
share with her.
Q. Okay. Who created that document?
A. I did.
Q. Personally?
A. Yes. Well, you know, I, I didn't type it I don't
suppose, but I directed it to be done.
Q. Okay. So do you know who would have typed it?
A. Well, if I didn't type it, then I assume it would
have been Jenny Mayfield, my assistant.
Q. Do you type?
A. I do type.
Q. You're not big on e-mail I take it?
A. No. Not in this job. I was in my prior job.
Q. Okay. And when you type, do you type at a word
processor and print it out?
A. Yeah.
Q. In reviewing the documents for production for
discovery or compliance with the subpoenas, have you ever seen
a copy of the redacted document that you shared with Ms.
Miller?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay.
A. Well, I'm not sure exactly what I shared but I think
I have.
Q. And how long was the document in terms of pages?
A. A third of a page.
Q. And did you share that document with the Vice
President prior to sharing it with Judith Miller?
A. No, sir.
Q. So what was your understanding? What did the Vice
President tell you the limits were on what you could share
with Judith Miller from what was contained in the NIE?
A. I could talk to her about the uranium section of the
NIE and about some of the key judgments from the NIE which
made it clear that Iraq was seeking weapons of mass
destruction.
Q. And what was it that you understood was new in what
you could share with Judith Miller that hadn't been in the
public domain yet, hadn't been discussed by other government
officials?
A. The language of the NIE which was — which is quoted
in Director Tenet's statement on July 11th, was that Iraq had
begun to vigorously pursue, something like this, very close to
it. Iraq had begun to vigorously pursue the acquisition of
uranium or the procurement of uranium, something like that.
Q. So the phrase including, including the word
"vigorously" trying to obtain or procure uranium was what the
Vice President wanted you to get into the public domain
through Judith Miller?
A. Yes. Flat declarative statement that it was so.
And that there were other instances, I guess. There were
several countries mentioned. There were countries mentioned
in addition to Niger.
Q. And had anyone asked you, any other reporters asked
you, about the NIE prior to your July 8th conversation with
Judith Miller?
A. I don't recall any.
Q. You met with David Sanger from the New York Times on
July 2nd. Correct?
A. Uh-hum.
Q. Do you know if you discussed the NIE with David
Sanger at that time?
A. I don't recall. There are notes of that
conversation. I don't recall discussing it as I sit here. If
I did, it was in the general sense that Dr. Rice had discussed
it without reference to the particular language.
Q. And do you know if you had a conversation with the
Vice President before you talked to Mr. Sanger about whether
or not he wanted you to share some of the contents of the NIE
concerning Niger and uranium with David Sanger?
A. I probably alerted the Vice President that I would
be meeting with Sanger, but I don't think we discussed
anything about the specific language of the NIE at that point.
Q. And the fact that you're meeting with David Sanger
that did not trigger a conversation with the Vice President
about what your authority was to discuss classified documents.
Is that fair to say?
A. I don't know. We would have been discussing it in
that period. I don't know that the meeting with Sanger, with
David Sanger, was critical for that.
Q. Was it the meeting with Judith Miller, with a
reporter that would turn out to be Judith Miller, was that the
event that triggered your conversation with the Vice President
about sharing the content of a classified document and your
conversation with David Addington, the Counsel for the Office
of Vice President?
A. Again, I don't think so. I think more the other way
around. There, there was this controversy about the famous
sixteen words and uranium, and the implication that people
were drawing is that because the IAEA in March had discovered
that the documents were forged, somehow the President didn't
have a good faith belief that — and the people who put the
statement in the speech, which was not us, did not have a good
faith belief on — that Iraq was in fact seeking the — to
obtain uranium. And the NIE and other documents made it clear
that in fact the Agency was advising the policy makers that
Iraq had sought to procure uranium from Niger and so there was
a general discussion which went on during that week separate
and apart from the Judith Miller discussions with Director
Tenet to try and get the CIA to make a statement, you know, as
soon as possible that would lay out what was in the NIE and
the other documents that had been put forward, some of which
are detailed in this memorandum that you showed me earlier.
Q. Your conversations with the Vice President about
wanting to get information from the NIE out into the public
domain but having concerns about the classification issue, did
those take place in person with the Vice President?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And is it fair to say that the whole issue of
the sixteen words took on an entirely different dimension
after the July 6th op-ed piece by Mr. Wilson, the July 6th
Meet the Press appearance, and then the July 7th statement
that appeared to step back from the sixteen words by Ari
Fleischer?
A. The statement from Ari Fleischer definitely changed
the atmosphere. It added to the heat. I mean, it was a lot
of heat to begin with which was what led Ari Fleischer to, to
make his statement.
Q. The, the discussions that led to sharing information
with Judith Miller, did they come as a result or did they come
after the July 6th op-ed by Wilson and the July 6th appearance
by Meet the Press — on Meet the Press by Mr. Wilson?
A. I think they preceded and followed the discussion,
the Wilson op-ed piece.
Q. And do you know when the Vice President eventually
told you that he had gotten permission from the President for
you to share this information with Ms. Miller? Was that after
July 6th?
A. I don't recall. I think it, I think it may have —
remember, I had this is recollection that there were — a
period when he said go ahead, and then a period when he said
stop, and go ahead. I don't recall how compressed that was.
Q. Did he give you a reason why he told you to stop
after he had first told you to go ahead?
A. No, I think he probably just — his sense of when
the right timing was. And then again, as I say, he then told
me to proceed again.
Q. Let me show you what we'll refer to in the record as
a document Bates Stamped 1746, which I believe are some of
your handwritten notes. Would you take a look at that page?
And as you'll see, there's an entry — I'll point to it,
three-quarters of the way down the page that appears to be
your symbol for the Vice President, a Y with the line over it.
And can you tell us what the rest of that entry says?
A. It's his instruction to me to telephone Judith
Miller —
Q. Okay.
A. — is how I read it.
Q. Is it the Vice President colon — and is the next
reference S.L. —
A. Yes.
Q. — meaning "Scooter" Libby?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then there's a symbol which I'll skip past in a
moment, and it says "Miller"?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is the symbol a "T" with an arrow under, under
it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is that your instruction to "telephone"?
A. Yes.
Q. And what do you recall that means? It's dated in
the upper left corner, as I understand, "July 8th, '02," but I
think, it's our understanding is that the '02 might be a typo,
and it's July 8th, '03.
A. Yes. I don't think that's my handwriting actually.
I think that may be Jenny's.
Q. Okay.
A. Jenny Mayfield. I'm sorry, but I lost the question
when I was thinking about the handwriting.
Q. Okay. And what did that reference mean?
A. It was the Vice President telling me to go ahead and
talk to Judith Miller.
Q. Okay, and is that, is that — as far as you
understand it, is that the final instruction to speak with
her?
A. I don't know that from this. It looks like it based
on the date at the top of the page, if the date's accurate.
Q. And do you know when you arranged to have — where
does Ms. Miller work?
A. She works in, I think, Washington and New York. But
I'm not sure.
Q. Do you know where she spends most of her time?
A. I don't. I would guess New York but I'm not sure.
Q. And do you know when you spoke with her if she was
in town or if she made a trip down from New York to come see
you?
A. I think it was set up the day before and I think she
was either in Washington or going to be in Washington, so I
don't think it was a special trip, but I'm not sure. I mean,
this is what I think she told me.
Q. And so was the, the meeting being set up the day
before, July 7th, and with your note being July 8th that the
Vice President told you to telephone Judith Miller, is it your
understanding that the initial decision to tell her would have
been on July 7th and it would have been reaffirmed again on
July 8th?
A. That could be.
Q. And do you know if you spoke to Judith Miller on
July 7th in advance of this meeting yourself?
A. I think I spoke to her on the phone to set up the
meeting. I recall my having spoken to her not the same day,
the day before, but it's possible it was the same day. Just a
recollection.
Q. And this meeting did not happen at the Office of the
Vice President. Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Where did you meet?
A. We met at the St. Regis Hotel which is, you know —
I think it's the closest hotel to the — in the, in the coffee
shop of the hotel, or the restaurant.
Q. And is there a reason you met at her hotel rather
than at the — at your office?
A. I think I wanted to meet with her at lunch, over
lunch, but my schedule or her schedule couldn't do the lunch
so we met for coffee instead.
Q. And isn't it fair to say, it's easier usually for
you if the people come to your office and you sit in your
office and meet and take less time out of your day than for
you to go out to see a reporter outside the building?
A. It's easier but I often go out. Yes, it is easier.
Q. And when you meet with reporters, would you say you
more often meet them inside your building versus you going to
meet them at a hotel or restaurant?
A. It depends on the purpose really. Many times
reporters want to come to see me to get — say they're doing a
profile piece on the, on the Vice President, meaning a piece
about his background or what he does every day type, you know,
one of these soft news stories. Often those people, we'll
have them come in, I see them in the office. When I want to
discuss sort of more of how the administration is approaching
an issue, some type of an off-record discussion, I often
choose to do that over lunch. It's part of my job to talk to
the press about different sorts of things and one of the types
of things we do when we talk to them is, you know, here's how
the administration generally is thinking about Iraq. We'll
have a discussion like that, or about China. I'll have that
usually as an off-the-record discussion over lunch just to
orient them to how we think about a problem. And it was that
type of atmosphere that I thought was the right atmosphere for
this.
Q. But you didn't have lunch. Correct?
A. We couldn't. That's why we had coffee.
Q. And that was 8 o'clock in the morning?
A. I've forgotten the time. I thought it was a little
later but it could be 8:00.
Q. Okay. Was there any — was the fact that you were
meeting with her and sharing information with her exclusively
one of the factors that wanted you to meet with her outside of
the building?
A. It could have been. It was also consistent with
that.
Q. And the fact that you were sharing a document with
her that you were not sharing with others, did you — did that
factor into your meeting with her at the hotel and not in your
building?
A. I could do that in the office also, but it was also
useful to do it — it had the right atmosphere to do it at the
St. Regis or someplace other than the office. So it would be
a more relaxed sort of setting was the primary reason. But
since I was going to be sharing this declassified document
with her, it was also useful to do it outside the building,
although I could have done it inside.
Q. And is it your understanding the document had been
declassified or is it your understanding that it was a
classified document but that you were authorized to share it
with Ms. Miller?
A. No, declassified.
Q. You understood it to be declassified because the
Vice President had told you that the President had authorized
you to talk about it?
A. Yes, sir. Because the President — there's no magic
process that I — according to counsel that has to be gone
through. If the President says to talk about this document,
it is then a declassified document. And that was the
understanding that I had with the Vice President when he went
to talk to the President about it.
Q. And in your career had you ever been authorized
before to talk about a document that you knew to be classified
with the press and therefore understood that the direction to
talk about the document with the press had in effect
declassified it?
A. I think this may be the first time I've ever talked
about a classified document in this fashion, getting it
declassified first.
Q. And has that happened since, since your conversation
with Judith Miller?
A. No, sir.
Q. So this would be the only time in your career that
you were told that you were authorized to discuss a document
that you had known to be classified but for the fact that you
were told that the President authorized you to discuss it?
A. Yes, sir. I think so.
Q. And how clear were you when you spoke to Mr.
Addington about whether this was appropriate to do? Did you
tell him that you wished to discuss a classified document with
a reporter but you had been authorized by the President
through the Vice President to do so?
A. I was very — I didn't use those words, but I was
very clear. Can the, can the Vice President — can the
President declassify a document just by telling us to talk —
and that's how he put it. If the President tells you to talk
about a document, it's declassified.
Q. And through your conversation with Addington you
made it clear that you were going to be talking about a
document with someone outside the government without a
security clearance. Correct?
A. It was not a — it was not specific to a document
but it was clearly asking him, could that be done? And he
explained how it could be done. Yes, sir.
Q. And so he understood, you made it clear to Mr.
Addington, that you were going to be talking about classified
material with the press or to the public, but you had been
authorized to do so?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did he express any reservations, Mr. Addington,
with your talking to the press or the public about a
classified document?
A. I may have answered the previous question a little
too fast. You said, you had been authorized to do so. I
don't think I said to him — it was in the context of, if I
have been authorized to do so. I don't think I said to him
explicitly the President had authorized, that sort of thing.
Q. But you made it clear that what you were asking him
was whether or not a fact otherwise classified could be
discussed with the press or the public if the President
authorized you to do so?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you did not have a conversation with Mr.
Addington where you asked him, could the President overrule
the Director of Central Intelligence, if the Director of
Central Intelligence refused to declassify a document?
A. My discussion with David Addington was that — David
Addington telling me that the President had it in his
authority to declassify a document.
Q. And my question is, did you make it clear to him
that your question wasn't whether the President had the
abstract authority to declassify a document, but whether the
President could in effect declassify a document by authorizing
an official to discuss classified material, otherwise
classified material, with the press or the public?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he indicate any reservations about that?
A. No, sir.
Q. And do you know when the Vice President talked to
the President to get the permission for you to discuss this
with the press and in effect in your mind declassify the
document?
A. No, sir.
Q. And were you present for that conversation?
A. No, sir.
Q. What did the Vice President tell you about that
conversation?
A. He told me he had talked to the President and we
should go ahead and, you know, talk to the press about the
NIE.
Q. And do you know if the Vice President told the
President what the legal issue was in terms of sharing
classified information?
A. I don't know what happened in that conversation.
But the Vice President knew that we needed to have the
President's authority to talk about the document, or that
section of the document.
Q. And was anyone else present with you when you
discussed with the Vice President the issue of whether or not
you could be authorized to discuss classified material with
the press or the public?
A. No, sir, but I referred him to the conversation with
David Addington.
Q. So as far as you know, did the Vice President and
David Addington discuss that issue?
A. I don't know.
Q. And do you know if the Vice President and the
President talked about it in person or by telephone?
A. I don't know.
Q. And do you know how long before your July 8th
meeting with Judith Miller that conversation took place?
A. I don't. My sense was that it was within a few
days, but I don't really know.
Q. Could it have been the day before, July 7th, as far
as you know?
A. Could have been, or it could have been some time at
the end of the previous weekend. I mean, excuse me, I mis-
spoke. End of the previous week, before the weekend. It
could have been any day in that period.
Q. And who else in the administration was told, as far
as you know, that you were authorized to discuss the relevant
portions of the NIE with Judith Miller?
A. Nobody as far as I know.
Q. So as far you know, the only three people who knew
about this would be the President, the Vice President and
yourself?
A. Correct, sir.
Q. And going up to July 18th, is it fair to say that
there were a number of different conversations within the
administration about declassifying the NIE?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And during those conversations did you ever tell any
of the other people that in fact the President had already
declassified the NIE in your mind?
A. No, sir.
Q. And in your presence did the Vice President ever
tell these other people that you understood that the NIE had
already been declassified?
A. No, sir.
Q. And as far as you know, was the CIA or Director
Tenet ever notified that the NIE had been declassified in your
mind as of July 8th with regard to those portions concerning
uranium?
A. No, sir.
Q. And were there conversations in which Mr. Hadley
discussed declassification of the NIE?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there conversations where Dr. Rice discussed
declassification of the NIE?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there conversations in which Andrew Card, the
Chief of Staff, discussed declassification of the NIE?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And during all those conversations it remained
unknown to them that in fact you understood that the NIE had
already been declassified?
A. By the President. Yes, sir.
Q. And is it fair to say that on July 10th the Vice
President, according to your notes, indicated that he would
recommend to the President declassification of the relevant
parts of the NIE?
A. My recollection is that's what he was telling Steve
Hadley should pass on to Director Tenet, that they wanted to
get those portions declassified and then they were
declassified.
Q. And so in your mind, the Vice President was telling
Steve Hadley to tell George Tenet that we, the Office of Vice
President, would recommend declassification even though at the
time, according to your account, both he and you knew that the
NIE had already been declassified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is it fair to say that in the following
conversations during that week there are a number of
conversations where people discussed declassification where
you and the Vice President knew that in your mind the
President had already authorized you to discuss this with the
press? Correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that unusual for you to have the National
Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence and the
White House Chief of Staff, among others, in the dark as to
something that you had done regarding declassification?
A. It is not unusual for the Vice President to tell me
something which I am not allowed to share with others. And
it's so — it doesn't happen very often — well, it happens
often that the Vice President will tell me something that I
cannot share with other people and I will sit in the room with
them while they talk about something. I think that many times
when they know something and I know something, but neither of
us know that the other person knows it or is supposed to know
and we don't talk about it, that happens quite frequently
actually.
Q. And with regard to declassification issues, are
there any other times that you're aware of that you knew that
something had been declassified by the President and other
members of the national security community were in the dark?
A. Yes, sir. There are numbers of times when the
President intends to make a statement about something, for
example. He's going to announce an initiative or he's going
to reveal in a speech that some — you know, that we have
intelligence on a certain point, and the fact that he is going
to do so is often closely held among a certain number of
people. And you can be in other people — be in meetings with
other people who don't know that you're about to give a speech
on that topic or unveil that initiative who are still treating
it as a classified matter and still believe it to be a
classified matter. So that happens not, not infrequently.
Q. Was there any other occasion where you knew the
press — a member of the press to have a document that had
been given to the press by the administration where others in
the administration still thought the information contained
therein was, was classified?
A. There are numbers of occasions where I understand,
usually not with me, usually with Director — with National
Security Advisor Rice, will be assigned to go background the
press about some initiative or something which the President
is going to do where other people that I talk to do not know
that in fact she is backgrounding people about it. There are
many occasions where she has backgrounded reporters about some
event and I'm in the room and I don't know that it's been
done. This happens a fair amount.
Q. How long have you known Judith Miller?
A. Not very long. I've known of Judith Miller from her
writings, and particularly from a book that she wrote, for
some time. But I had actually only met her, I think, once
before July 8th.
Q. And what was the occasion before July 8th that you
had met Ms. Miller?
A. I had, I think, contacted Ms. Miller because I
wanted to meet her. I under — I believe her to be a serious
reporter who cares about the substance of, of the issues. She
had written a book called "Germs", if I recall, which is about
biological warfare with another reporter who is a friend of
mine. I think it's — well, Steve Engleberg, I think is the
co-author. And he had interviewed me for the book. I had
never spoken to her in connection with the book. But the book
is a serious attempt to go through at great length how the
administrations, administrations, not just this one, or
actually not this one, the Clinton administration, the Bush
administration, others had looked at the threat of biological
warfare and I considered her from this and from other things
the sort of reporter who actually cares about the substance of
it and wants to get it right so they're doing the best at —
the highest function of the press which is to alert the public
as to, you know, a serious issue as a compliment to when the
administrations talk about a serious issue. And she had
obviously spent a lot of time on this issue and cared about
it, so I wanted to meet her to get to know her and so I called
her and she was glad to come in, and we had a — my
recollection is we had a meeting in my office some weeks
before July 8th.
Q. And when you met her, and when you say some weeks
before, we are talking May, June, spring of 2003?
A. I don't recall. It would be on my schedule. And
that would be the first time I met her, as I recall.
Q. Okay. And that was the first time you recall
meeting her even on a social occasion?
A. I don't recall ever meeting her before that. It's
possible.
Q. And did anyone go with you to the meeting with
Judith Miller on July 8th?
A. On July 8? No. No, sir.
Q. Okay. And did you bring anything else besides the
redacted portion of the NIE with you?
A. I may have had some notes, something like that.
Q. Do you know if you brought any talking points?
A. I think I had talking points — I think I had other
notes that I'm not sure if I used or not, which were of the
same nature. Things — you know, statements from the NIE from
the first part, from the judgments part, but I'm not — I
think I had those with me, but I don't, I don't think I — I
don't know if I used them all.
Q. Did you bring the NIE itself?
A. No, sir, I don't think so.
Q. And did Judith Miller ever write a piece as a result
of your meeting with her?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I don't know. It was a totally failed effort to get
the NIE out as far as I could tell.
Q. And we'll go forward — the last time you told us
about a conversation you had with Judith Miller, you believe
on a Saturday where you discussed Wilson's wife working at the
CIA. Do you recall that testimony?
A. It was on the weekend of the aircraft carrier trip,
July 12th, 13. Yes, sir.
Q. And how certain are you that you had a conversation
with Judith Miller about Wilson's wife working at the CIA on
the weekend as opposed to being part of the July 8th meeting?
A. I'm certain I talked to her about it from my home
because I remember where I was.
Q. And where were you?
A. In my little office, cluttered.
Q. Okay. And what phone did you use?
A. I think either the government — there are two
phones in that office and I don't know which one I used. One
is my personal home phone and the other is — I think I used
my personal home phone.
Q. And you also have a government phone there?
A. There's also a government phone there.
Q. Do you know what the phone number is to the
government phone?
A. I don't.
Q. Okay. Is that — that's not the same number as your
government office, I take it?
A. Correct, it is not.
Q. And the phone bills, I presume since it's a
government phone, go to the government, not to you?
A. I certainly hope so. I've never been quite clear,
but I'm hoping I'm not paying for that phone.
Q. Okay. So there are two phones. One is your
personal phone and if you, if you think about it when you make
calls, you make personal calls on your personal phone and
business calls on your government phone?
A. It's not quite that rigorous. I make many business
calls on my personal phone. In fact, this one was a business
call on my personal phone.
Q. Okay. So you believe you used your personal phone?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. And on your personal phone, what's your long
distance service?
A. AT&T, I guess.
Q. Okay. Are they all — do you get two separate bills
at the end of every month, for local service and a separate
one for long-distance or are they one bill?
A. I, I think my wife pays the phone bills. I think
there are two bills, but I'm not sure.
Q. And do you use a phone card for long-distance? Is
it your practice to dial one of those numbers that —
A. No, I think on this — well, from my home I would
just use my own — I could have used the government card and
probably should have, but I think I just paid for it myself.
Q. Okay. And do you have a personal long-distance
service that you use, a personal phone card that you employ?
A. Yes —
Q. And what —
A. — it's one — you mean a phone card that goes to my
person — that goes to my home phone, just my home phone?
Yes.
Q. And what company is that with?
A. It would be — I guess it's the same. I assume it's
the same.
Q. Is it your practice when you make calls from your
home just to dial 1, the area code and the number?
A. Unfortunately sir, yes.
Q. Okay, so you don't do the 10 cents a minute service?
A. No, sir. And I, and I don't charge it to the
government usually, although I suppose I should.
Q. Okay. And your recollection is that when you spoke
to Ms. Miller on that weekend you were using your personal
phone at your home, but possibly your government phone at your
home?
A. Yes, sir. I think it was my personal phone.
Q. Okay. Any chance you used your cell phone, your
government cell phone?
A. My recollection of the call to Judith Miller is that
it, it was interrupted and I think I did all of them on my,
all of them on my home desk phone.
Q. Okay. And how many cell phones do you have?
A. Just the one.
MR. FITZGERALD. The government cell phone. Okay,
why don't we break at 10:45 and come back —
GRAND JUROR. At 1100 hours, please.
MR. FITZGERALD. 1100 hours, military time. That's
fine. Thank you.
WITNESS. Thank you.
(Whereupon, the witness was excused at 10:45
A.m.)
(Whereupon, the witness was recalled at 11:17
A.m.)
GRAND JUROR. And we'll just remind you, you're
still under oath.
WITNESS. Thank you.
GRAND JUROR. Thank you.
BY MR. FITZGERALD:
Q. And clarifying two points on the conversation with
Judith Miller. Do you recall whether or not you discussed Mr.
Wilson's wife at all during your conversation on July 8th with
Ms. Miller?
A. I don't recall. I don't recall any discussion —
Writings 
