Unlike Urban, the locals are no doubt familiar with the reality
expressed by senior British army commanders in Iraq when they decried
the “tragic” and “awful” American habit of viewing Iraqis "as
untermenschen”, such that “they are not concerned about the Iraqi loss
of life”. (Quoted, Sean Rayment, 'US tactics condemned by British
officers,' Daily Telegraph, April 11, 2004)
As we noted earlier this month, a senior US military investigator
described the view all along the US chain of command: “Iraqi civilian
lives are not as important as US lives, their deaths are just the cost
of doing business...”. (Josh White, ‘Report On Haditha Condemns
Marines,’ Washington Post, April 21, 2007)
The American soldiers interviewed by Urban seemed friendly, likeable,
if somewhat embittered. One was shown playing guitar, singing a ballad
- Urban described them as “extraordinarily welcoming”. In a BBC Online
article, he was full of admiration:
“You can marvel at the Americans' can-do spirit, as some British
soldiers do. You can see it in terms of America, the world's hyper
power staring failure in the face and refusing to accept it. But in the
sergeant's case the will to carry on comes from a sense of
responsibility towards the people of Iraq.” (Urban, ‘”Can-do” spirit of US troops in Baghdad,’ May 17, 2007)
Urban was disturbed by the qualities of the men he met:
“From the odd glimpse or overheard remark, I do not doubt that the
second platoon contains the odd bad apple or loud-mouth, but as my time
with them went on I became aware of an uncomfortable feeling.
“When eventually I was able to identify it, I realised my unease
concerned British soldiers, and how they compared with these Americans.
Carlisle, Perez and the rest seem brighter, stronger and more
committed.” (Ibid)
No doubt warriors in the front line have often seemed this way to their
own: “The senators are good men, but the senate is a beast,” as has
long been observed. It is close to unforgivable for reporters to fail
to make the distinction, as Urban so patently did. This failure being
the predictable first casualty of embedded journalism, as the military
well know.
In his online article, Urban pondered a conundrum:
“If they are that good, you might ask, why are they not getting better
results in Baghdad? There is history, of course, of terrible past
mistakes. There are numbers: Baghdad is a city of six million. There is
also ruthless intimidation by al-Qaeda of local people and the simple
prejudice of those who will never like the Americans because they are
unbelievers.” (Ibid)
As ever in mainstream journalism, our side merely makes “mistakes”,
while the ‘bad guys’ mete out “ruthless intimidation”. The problem
centres on the West’s favourite bogeymen, “al Qaeda”, not Iraqi
resistance fighters waging war on a brutal occupation. Local people are
being intimidated by these monsters, we are told, although a September
2006 World Public Opinion (WPO) poll found that 61 per cent of Shia and
92 per cent of Sunni approved of attacks on US forces, while 78 per
cent of Iraqis (including 82% Shia and 97% Sunni) believed the US
presence was “provoking more conflict than it is preventing”. (‘
The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq,’ September 27, 2006)
Compare Urban’s version with the Iraq Study Group Report published last December:
“Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency.
The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime,
disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has significant
support within the Sunni Arab community... Al Qaeda is responsible for
a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the
more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks
on significant religious or political targets.” (The Iraq Study Group
Report, December 6, 2006)
Intimidation and irrational hatred of “unbelievers“ aside, another
possibility springs to mind - could it be that Iraqis have a problem
with being illegally invaded by a superpower army sent by an American
administration packed to the gills with former oil executives?
John Pilger puts Urban’s film in perspective:
"The US government, together with the British government, have brought
bloodshed on a scale unimagined to Iraq. The so-called civil war is a
direct result of an illegal, rapacious invasion carried out by these
two governments on the basis of demonstrable lies. That is not opinion;
that is a fact – a fact recognised, it is fair to say, by most of
humanity. Mark Urban's deeply embedded, nineteenth century view of the
bennign intentions of the invaders is laughable in the blackest, most
profane sense." (Pilger, email to Media Lens, May 18, 2007)
Ulterior Aims - The Pickles And Lettuce Conspiracy
Most insidiously, journalists of the ‘liberal’ press are obscuring the
truth even while bewailing the mendacity of others. Thus the
Independent’s comment editor, Adrian Hamilton, recently wrote an
article dramatically titled, ‘A desperate attempt to rewrite history’.
Hamilton commented:
“The latest attempt to rewrite history comes from Geoff Hoon who was
Defence Secretary at the time of the Iraq invasion... Anyway he's now
popping up to explain that, yes, there were some damaging errors made
in the aftermath of the invasion, but that he and Tony Blair had
advised the US administration strongly against the two worst mistakes -
the decisions to disband the Iraqi army and to de-Baathify the
ministries.” (Hamilton, ‘A desperate attempt to rewrite history,’ The Independent, May 3, 2007)
The ugliest aspect of this blame shifting, Hamilton observed, “is that
it is all there to avoid the central question of whether we were right
to invade Iraq in the first place”. The incompetence and indifference
afflicting that “mistake” were staggering and rooted in the same ugly
truth:
“We didn't go to war for the sake of the Iraqi people. We went to war
to change a regime. The Americans wanted it as the first move in
reshaping the Middle East. Tony Blair wanted it because he fancied
himself as the toppler of a tyrant.”
The motivation “was to do with ulterior aims bought at the cost of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian lives".
Amazingly, nowhere in his article did Hamilton feel inclined to spell
out the “ulterior aims” guiding the US in “reshaping the Middle East”.
Noam Chomsky has commented:
"The party line we have to rigidly adhere to says you're not allowed to
talk about the reasons for invading Iraq. We're supposed to believe
that the US would've invaded Iraq if it was an island in the Indian
Ocean and its main exports were pickles and lettuce. This is what we're
supposed to believe. Now the truth of the matter, obvious to anyone not
committed to the party line, is that Iraq has huge oil resources, maybe
the second in the world, mostly untapped, that it's right in the middle
of the main energy-producing region of the world and that taking
control of Iraq will strengthen enormously the US's control over the
major energy resources of the world.” (Chomsky, ‘On the Iraq Election,’ December 18, 2005)
But this is not a fit subject for mainstream discussion, not even in an
article focusing on “a desperate attempt to rewrite history“.
Curiously, an August-September, 2003 Gallup poll found that forty-three
per cent of Iraqis believed US and British forces invaded primarily "to
rob Iraq's oil". 5 per cent believed the United States invaded Iraq "to
assist the Iraqi people", and 1 per cent believed it was to establish
democracy. (Walter Pincus, ‘Skepticism About U.S. Deep, Iraq Poll
Shows,’ Washington Post, November 12, 2003)
This fits well with a January 2006 WPO which found that 80 per cent of
Iraqis believed that the US government planned to have permanent bases
in Iraq. A further 76 per cent said they thought the US would not
withdraw if asked to do so by the Iraqi government. (
‘What the Iraqi Public Wants,’ January 31, 2006)
An April 2007 WPO poll of Islamic countries found that an overwhelming
majority in Egypt (93%) said that maintaining “control over the oil
resources of the Middle East” was a goal of the United States (84%
definitely), as well as strong majorities in Morocco (82%), Indonesia
(74%) and Pakistan (68%). On average 79 per cent had this perception. (
Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda, April 24, 2007)
None of this is allowed to exist for mainstream journalism - "mistakes"
and "bad apples" are recognised, but not facts that challenge the
fundamental benevolence of Western power.
SUGGESTED ACTION
The goal of Media Lens is to promote rationality, compassion and
respect for others. If you decide to write to journalists, we strongly
urge you to maintain a polite, non-aggressive and non-abusive tone.
Write to Mark Urban
email:mark.urban@bbc.co.uk
Write to Peter Barron, editor of Newsnight
email:peter.barron@bbc.co.uk
Write to Adrian Hamilton
email:a.hamilton@independent.co.uk
Write to Simon Kelner, editor of the Independent
email:s.kelner@independent.co.uk
Please send a copy of your emails to us
email:editor@medialens.org
Please do NOT reply to the email address from which this media alert originated. Please instead email us at
email:editor@medialens.org
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