To date, more than a month after the incident, Pentagon investigators have completely ignored a peculiar cluster of six deaths, during the weeks immediately preceding and following the flight, of personnel at the two Air Force bases involved in the incident and at Air Force Commando Operations headquarters.
The problem with this theory is that dummy warheads don’t look
the same as the real thing. The real warheads, called W80-1’s, are
shiny silver, a color which is clearly visible through
postage-stamp-sized windows on the nosecone covers that protect them on
the missiles. In addition, the mounted warheads are encased in a red
covering as a second precaution.
Apparently the nukes (which can be set to explode at between 5 kilotons
and 150 kilotons) were easily spotted by a Barksdale AFB ground crew
when they went out to the plane on the tarmac hours after it landed. If
the Barksdale ground crew, which had absolutely no reason to suspect it
was looking at nuclear-tipped missiles, easily spotted the “error,” why
did everyone at Minot miss it, as claimed?
Clearly, whoever loaded the six nukes on one B-52 wing pylon, and
whoever mounted that unit on the wing, knew or should have known that
they were dealing with nukes — and absent an order from the highest
authority in Washington, loading such nukes on a bomber was against all
policy. The odds of randomly putting six nukes all on one pylon, and
six dummies on the other, are 1:924. And how curious that the pilot,
who is supposed to check all 12 missiles before flying, checked only
the pylon containing the dummy warheads.
Various experts familiar with nuclear-weapons-handling protocols
express astonishment at what happened on Aug. 29 and 30. After all,
over the course of more than six decades, the protocols for handling
nuclear arms have called for at least two people at every step, with
paper trails, bar codes, and real-time computer tracking of every
warhead in the arsenal. Nothing like this has been known to have
happened before. Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger, who served as US
Strategic Command chief from 1996 to 1998, told the
Post, “I a have been in the nuclear business since 1966 and am not aware of any incident more disturbing.”
Philip Coyle, a senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information
who served as assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton
administration, calls the incident “astonishing” and “unbelievable.”
He says, “This wasn’t just a mistake. I’ve counted, and at least 20
things had to have gone wrong for this to have occurred.”
Bruce Blair, a former Air Force nuclear launch officer who is now
president of the World Security Institute, says that the explanation of
the incident as laid out in the
Washington Post,
and in the limited statements from the Air Force and Department of
Defense, which call it a “mistake,” are “incomplete.” He notes that no
mention has been made as to whether the nukes in question, which had
been pre-mounted on a pylon for attachment to the B-52 wing, had their
PAL (permission action link) codes unlocked to make them operational,
or whether a system on board the plane that would ordinarily prevent an
unauthorized launch had been activated. “For all we know, these
missiles could have been fully operational,” he says.
The Air Force and Department of Defense are refusing to answer any questions about such matters.
Meanwhile, there are those six deaths. On July 20, 1st Lt. Weston
Kissel, a 28-year-old B-52 pilot from Minot, died in a motorcycle
accident while on home leave in Tennessee.
Another Minot B-52 pilot, 20-year-old Adam Barrs, died on July 5 in
Minot when a car he was riding in, driven by another Minot airman,
Stephen Garrett, went off the road, hit a tree, and caught fire. Airman
Garrett was brought to the hospital in critical condition and has since
been charged with negligent homicide.
Two more Air Force personnel, Senior Airman Clint Huff, 29, of
Barksdale AFB, and his wife Linda died on Sept. 15 in nearby
Shreveport, Louisiana, when Huff reportedly attempted to pass a van in
a no-passing zone on his motorcycle, and the van made a left-hand turn,
striking them.
Then there are two reported suicides, which both occurred within days
of the flight. One involved Todd Blue, a 20-year-old airman who was in
a unit that guarded weapons at Minot. He reportedly shot himself in the
head on Sept. 11 while on a visit to his family in Wytheville,
Virginia. Local police investigators termed his death a suicide.
The second suicide, on Aug. 30, was John Frueh, a special forces
weather commando at the Air Force’s Special Operations command
headquartered at Hurlburt AFB in Florida. Hurlburt’s website says,
“Every night, as millions of Americans sleep peacefully under the
blanket of freedom,” Air Force Special Operations commandos work “in
deep dark places, far away from home, risking their lives to keep that
blanket safe.”
Frueh, 33, a married father of two who had just received approval for
promotion from captain to major, reportedly flew from Florida to
Portland, Oregon, for a friend’s wedding. He never showed up. Instead,
he called on Aug. 29, the day the missiles were loaded, from an
interstate pull-off just outside Portland to say he was going for a
hike in a park nearby. (It is not clear why he was at a highway rest
stop as he had no car.) A day later, back in Portland, he rented a car
at the airport, again calling his family. After he failed to appear at
the wedding, his family filed a missing person’s report with the
Portland police. The Sheriff’s Department in remote Skamania County,
Washington, found Frueh’s rental car ten days later on the side of a
road nearly 120 miles from the airport in a remote area of Badger Peak.
Search dogs found his body in the woods. His death was ruled a suicide,
though neither the sheriff’s investigator nor the medical examiner
would give details. What makes this alleged suicide odd, however, is
that the sheriff reports that Frueh had with him a knapsack containing
a GPS locator and a videocam — odd equipment for someone intent on
ending his life.
Of course, it could be that all six of these deaths are coincidences —
all just accidents and personal tragedies. But when they occur around
the time six nuclear-tipped missiles go missing in a bizarre incident,
the likes of which the Pentagon hasn’t seen before, one would think
investigators would be on those cases like vultures on carrion. In
fact, police and medical examiners in the Frueh and Blue cases say no
federal investigators, whether from DOD or FBI, have called them. Worse
still, because the B-52 incident got so little media attention — no
coverage in most local news — none of those investigating the accidents
and suicides even knew about it or about the other deaths.
“It would have been interesting to know all that when I was examining
Mr. Blue’s body,” says Virginia coroner Mike Stoker, “but no one told
me about any of it or asked me about him.”
“If we had known that several people had died under questionable
circumstances, it might have affected how we’d look at a body,” says
Don Phillips, the sheriff’s deputy in Washington State who investigated
the Frueh death. “But nobody from the federal government has ever
contacted us about this.”
“Certainly, in a case like this, the suicides should be a red flag,”
says Hans Kristensen, a nuclear-affairs expert with the Federation of
American Scientists. It’s wild speculation to think that there might be
some connection between the deaths and the incident, but it certainly
should be investigated.”
For More of the Minot Nuke Stories:
More Questions About the Minot Nukes