The Bush administration’s placatory response to Musharraf’s
actions (not going further than carefully-worded, benign condemnations)
is not the only thing that makes it hard to substantiate the claim that
Musharraf acted independently of the US or at the behest of some
elements in the Pakistani military alone. Following September 11, 2001,
and the invasion of Afghanistan soon after, Musharraf has become one of
America’s most faithful allies in the region. US aid to Pakistan
multiplied and spent with little accountability. According to Jeffrey
D. Sachs, a Professor of Economics at Columbia University, “75% of the
$10 billion in US aid has gone to the Pakistani military, ostensibly to
reimburse Pakistan for its contribution to the ‘war on terror,’ and to
help it buy F-16s and other weapons systems. Another 16% went straight
to the Pakistani budget, no questions asked. That left less than 10%
for development and humanitarian assistance.”
The Pakistani
president is Machiavellian part and parcel. Contrary to appearances, he
knows his limits and plays by the unwritten rules of power. When he
declared emergency, he cited two objectives with underlying messages.
The
first was aimed at his detractors who he claimed had mounted a
‘conspiracy’ to destabilize the country and his rule; as this
conspiracy allegedly involved the judiciary, it justified his purge
campaign.
The second message cleverly transcended all of that to reel in the US
and its ‘war on terror’. Indeed, according to this logic, Musharraf
needed a state of emergency to combat a Taliban-inspired insurgency
stemming from the tribal areas in the North West Frontier Province.
With the US and NATO fighting their own Taliban and Taliban-inspired
insurgency in Afghanistan, Musharraf’s actions in Islamabad were meant
to supplement the incessant efforts at curbing the terrorist resurgence
in the entire region.
It
is hardly news that countries which to utilize ‘war on terror’
reasoning to justify violating human rights and democracy in their own
countries are often - if not always - American allies or clients.
Musharraf
must have understood that his failure to cooperate with US military
plans would invite US wrath and hasten his exit (violent or otherwise).
While his ‘cooperation’ was hardly optional, it also had its rewards.
One of these was a free hand to alter internal political structures, so
long as they didn’t in any way interfere with US interests. Musharraf
tested this unspoken understanding, and the Bush administration kept
true to its word - until the US Congress decided to interfere.
At
the same time that Musharraf began decrying the Taliban-inspired
insurgency in the tribal areas, US officials began highlighting - if
not manipulating - intelligence that exaggerated the same threat.
For
example, US Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a media briefing
on December 21 that Al Qaeda insurgents are shifting focus to Pakistan,
threatening the country and its ‘people’. Gates dismissed the Taliban’s
violent return to Afghanistan, even mocking the over-publicized spring
offensive. “The spring offensive we expected from the Taliban became
NATO's spring offensive," he told journalists in Washington. Why this
sudden change of priorities, and why did they coincide so well with
Musharraf’s own changes?
The shift - which has made Pakistan the
primary battleground, as opposed to its previous position as a less
important frontier than Afghanistan- could mean a major strategic
change in US military policy toward Pakistan in the future. It also
emphasises the importance of the role played by Musharraf and his
regime.
Musharraf’s validation is urgently needed by the Bush
administration now that Congress has passed the spending bill, putting
limits on $300 million of US military aid to Pakistan. $250 million is
be used strictly for counter-terrorism operation, and the delivery of
the rest hinges on Pakistan’s success - or failure - in living up to
the Congress’ strict conditions. This deviation, if not contained
quickly, might cause a rift and future difficulties for the US in
Pakistan, especially among disgruntled military figures competing for
power, privilege and contracts. For now, the White House has gone on
crisis management mode, touting the January 8 elections and paying lip
service to democracy, free media access and so forth.
One of
those involved in defending Musharraf’s record is US Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Boucher, who, on December 20, said that
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should be able to report that
Pakistan is on its way toward full restoration of democracy. "We're
trying to keep moving toward elections that are as fair and as free as
possible. We do think there are (additional) steps that can be taken
and will be taken," Boucher said.
The US administration and Congress are likely to clash over the best
ways to control Pakistan, or - to put it mildly - to ensure Pakistan’s
continuous cooperation in the US ‘war on terror’. However the clash
manifests, the resulting US foreign policy posture is likely to affect
changes – substantial or otherwise – in US policy toward Pakistan,
resulting in further interference in the country’s internal affairs,
deepening the discord and fuelling more violence. Indeed, it may
endanger the future of genuine democracy in Pakistan for years to come.
Ramzy
Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers
and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second Palestinian
Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle (Pluto Press, London).
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