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by William Fisher
The government’s spotty record in obtaining convictions of people charged with providing “material support” to terrorist organizations is adding new impetus to the efforts of prominent constitutional lawyers to seek substantial changes in the law.
The latest failure in a terrorism-financing prosecution came late in 2007, when a Texas jury failed to render any guilty verdicts in the trial of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) – once the largest and most prominent charity dedicated to supporting Palestinian and other Muslim causes. Several HLF officials were charged with giving money to Hamas, the militant Palestinian organization designated a terrorist group by the U.S. in 1995. The trial ended with a mix of acquittals and deadlocks.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation started looking into HLF in 1993. In December 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department (DOT) seized and confiscated the charity’s assets and records, effectively putting the organization out of business. Given that outcome, some legal scholars have questioned why the government pursued a criminal prosecution at all. The trial did not begin until mid-2007.
William Neal, a juror in the HLF case, told the media that the government’s evidence “was pieced together over the course of a decade — a phone call this year, a message another year.” Instead of trying to prove that the defendants knew they were supporting terrorists, Mr. Neal said, prosecutors “danced around the wire transfers by showing us videos of little kids in bomb belts and people singing about Hamas, things that didn’t directly relate to the case.”
Civil liberties groups say the HLF case was just the latest in
a line of misguided
prosecutions. One such group, OMB Watch, charges that the USA Patriot
Act gives the government “largely unchecked power to designate any
group as a terrorist organization.” It says that “once a charitable
organization is so designated, all of its materials and property may be
seized and its assets frozen. The charity is unable to see the
government’s evidence and thus understand the basis for the charges.
Since its assets are frozen, it lacks resources to mount a defense. And
it has only limited right of appeal to the courts. So the government
can target a charity, seize its assets, shut it down, obtain
indictments against its leaders, but then delay a trial almost
indefinitely.”
One
result, say critics of the government’s policy, is that Muslim
charities have experienced a precipitous decline in contributions.
Contributions that do arrive often come in cash from anonymous givers.
And donors who happen to be Muslim are increasingly turning to the
large household names like Oxfam and Save the Children, which may
conduct programs in predominantly Muslim areas abroad.
One of
America’s foremost constitutional scholars, Prof. David Cole of the
Georgetown University Law Center, argues that the “material support
principle is ‘guilt by association’ in 21st-century garb, and presents
all of the same problems that criminalizing membership and association
did during the Cold War.” He told us that the problem requires
fundamental changes in the terrorism-financing law.
Included in Cole’s recommendations for major changes:
1.
The Treasury Department should be required to permit closed charities
to direct their collected funds to charities mutually approved by the
frozen charity and the government.
2. Congress should enact a
statutory definition of a "specially designated terrorist." “Right now
the Treasury Department makes such designations entirely on the basis
of an Executive Order, and accordingly Congress has given the President
essentially a blank check,” Cole told us.
3. Treasury should
allow designated entities to use their own funds to pay for their own
defense. “Treasury not only shuts down charities in a secretive
one-sided process, but then bars the charities from using any of their
own money to defend themselves against the designation,” according to
Cole.
4. The criminal material support statutes should be
amended to require proof that an individual supported a proscribed
group with the intent to further its illegal activities. “Today,”
according to the government, “even aid intended to discourage terrorist
activities is a crime under the material support laws,” Cole says.
He
adds, “There is no requirement that the aid have any connection to
terrorism,” and cites a case he is handling with the Humanitarian Law
Project (HLP) at the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR).
He
told us, “My clients had been providing human rights advocacy training
to the PKK in Turkey, as a way of encouraging them to use peaceful
lawful means to resolve their disputes with the Turkish government over
its treatment of the Kurdish minority. By encouraging lawful outlets
for dispute resolution, such aid would presumably discourage terrorism.
Yet under the material support statute it is a crime even if HLP could
prove that both the purpose and the effect of their support was to
decrease the PKK's resort to violence.”
OMB Watch says the
“material support” effort has resulted in the government shutting down
charities that were not on any government watch list before their
assets were frozen.
The organization says the result is that
Muslims have no way of knowing which groups the government suspects of
ties to terrorism. “Organizations and individuals suspected of
supporting terrorism are guilty until proven innocent,” it says.
OMB Watch told us, “A group could comply 100% and still be shut down ‘pending an investigation’."
Material-support
cases are just a small fraction of the Justice Department’s terrorism
prosecutions, but some observers believe they represent a shift in
government strategy from punishment to prevention. Earlier prosecutions
were for acts of violence that actually took place. Examples include
the first World Trade Center attack, the 1998 bombings of American
embassies in Africa, and conspiracies that were relatively close to
fruition.
Nonetheless, government terror-financing prosecutions
have been reasonably successful. From the Sept. 11 attacks to last
July, the government started 108 material-support prosecutions and
completed 62. Juries convicted nine defendants, 30 defendants pleaded
guilty, and 11 pleaded guilty to other charges. There were eight
acquittals and four dismissals.
In terrorism prosecutions
involving a violent act actually committed or near fruition, the
government’s record is spottier. According to the Center on Law and
Security at the New York University School of Law, the government has a
29 percent conviction rate in terrorism prosecutions overall, compared
with 92 percent for felonies generally.
The latest government
setback involves the so-called Liberty City Seven – seven men named for
the blighted Miami district where they allegedly operated. Charged with
plotting to join forces with al-Qaeda to blow up Chicago's Sears Tower,
one was acquitted last month and a mistrial was declared for the six
others after the federal jury deadlocked.
Prosecutors
acknowledged that no attack was imminent, and then-Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales said after the arrests in mid-2006 that the alleged
terror cell was ''more aspirational than operational.''
In some
cases, defendants are arguably convicted of terror-related offenses in
the court of public opinion rather than in the courts. One example
often cited by lawyers is the case of Dr. Rafil Dhafir, an Iraqi-born
American citizen, who organized and raised money for a charity
providing humanitarian relief to children in Iraq. He was never charged
in court with a terrorist-related offense; the word “terrorism” was not
allowed to be used in his trial, although prominent politicians such as
then-New York Governor George Pataki hailed his arrest as a victory in
the war on terror.
The upstate New York oncologist was sentenced
to 22 years in jail in 2005 for 59 felony charges, including violating
U.S. sanctions against Iraq.

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