Open Steve Coll's aptly titled book, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, at almost any page and you're likely to find something that makes a mockery of the film Charlie Wilson's War. There, on p. 90, for instance, is the larger-than-life CIA director of the era, William Casey, the "Catholic Knight of Malta educated by Jesuits," who "believed fervently that by spreading the Catholic Church's reach and power he could contain Communism's advance, or reverse it." And, if you couldn't have the Church do it, as in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then second best, Casey believed, were the Islamic warriors of jihad, the more extreme the better, with whom, in his religio-anticommunism, he believed himself to have much in common. (The enemy of my enemy is my friend, after all.) Casey was, in fact, an American jihadi, eager in the 1980s not just to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan, but to push "the Afghan jihad into the Soviet Union itself." His CIA, while funding activities like translating the Koran into Uzbek (Uzbekistan being, then, an SSR of the Soviet Union), was also, through Pakistan's intelligence service, funneling a vast flow of advanced weaponry regularly to the most extreme (and, even then, anti-American) of Afghan jihadis.
I could go on, starting perhaps with the president Casey served, Ronald Reagan, who declared
the Afghan anti-Soviet fighters his CIA director was running, partly
with Saudi money, to be "the moral equal of our founding fathers." None
of this was exactly secret information, or even hard to find, at the
time that the movie Charlie Wilson's War was being made which makes it a top candidate for the most politically bizarre, consciously dumb film of our era.
Two well-known entertainment-industry liberals, director Mike Nichols
and Aaron Sorkin (the man responsible for "The West Wing"), have tried
to take possession of part of that great anti-Soviet Afghan jihad
for well, whom? The Democratic Party? As hopeless an undertaking as
this was, there was only one way to turn it and its horrific aftermath
into a feel-good, celebratory liberal film. So they wrote all the
Reaganauts out of the picture, which meant excising history from
history. They created a movie in which neither Ronald Reagan, nor
William Casey even exists. You could easily think that the Afghan
operation had simply been run by Democratic Congressman Charlie Wilson
and a low-level CIA agent more or less on their own. Leaving out the
crucial cast of characters was, in this case, comparable to, but far
stranger than, what the propagandists of the former Soviet Union used
to do in airbrushing discredited leaders out of official photos. Ronald
who?
Coll's book was published in 2004. Chalmers Johnson's Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
came out in 2000, 18 months before the attacks of 9/11. Its prescient
analysis made it a prophetic text and propelled it onto bestseller
lists after the 9/11 attacks (and "blowback," a CIA term of trade, into
popular culture). Even though he wrote that book well before those
towers came down, Johnson saw clearly that, while "American policies
helped ensure that the Soviet Union would suffer the same kind of
debilitating defeat in Afghanistan as the United States had in Vietnam
in Afghanistan the United States also helped bring to power the
Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic movement." Even more important, he
noted that the "mujahideen, who only a few years earlier the United
States had armed with ground-to-air Stinger missiles, grew bitter over
American acts and policies " with consequences that were, even then,
becoming apparent and would soon enough culminate in a horrific
blowback from a CIA-run operation that had been deemed a great success.
Thank heavens, then, that Chalmers Johnson, whose magisterial book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (the final volume of his Blowback Trilogy) will be appearing in paperback this month, puts a little history back into Charlie Wilson's War in his own inimitable manner. Tom
Imperialist Propaganda
Second Thoughts on Charlie Wilson's War
By Chalmers Johnson
I have some personal knowledge of Congressmen like
Charlie Wilson (D-2nd District, Texas, 1973-1996) because, for close to
twenty years, my representative in the 50th Congressional District of
California was Republican Randy "Duke" Cunningham, now serving an
eight-and-a-half year prison sentence for soliciting and receiving
bribes from defense contractors. Wilson and Cunningham held exactly the
same plummy committee assignments in the House of Representatives the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee plus the Intelligence Oversight
Committee from which they could dole out large sums of public money
with little or no input from their colleagues or constituents.
Both men flagrantly abused their positions but with radically
different consequences. Cunningham went to jail because he was too
stupid to know how to game the system retire and become a lobbyist
whereas Wilson received the Central Intelligence Agency Clandestine
Service's first "honored colleague" award ever given to an outsider and
went on to become a $360,000 per annum lobbyist for Pakistan.
In a secret ceremony at CIA headquarters on June 9, 1993, James
Woolsey, Bill Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence and one
of the agency's least competent chiefs in its checkered history, said:
"The defeat and breakup of the Soviet empire is one of the great events
of world history. There were many heroes in this battle, but to Charlie
Wilson must go a special recognition." One important part of that
recognition, studiously avoided by the CIA and most subsequent American
writers on the subject, is that Wilson's activities in Afghanistan led
directly to a chain of blowback that culminated in the attacks of
September 11, 2001 and led to the United States' current status as the
most hated nation on Earth.
On May 25, 2003, (the same month George W. Bush stood on the flight deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln
under a White-House-prepared "Mission Accomplished" banner and
proclaimed "major combat operations" at an end in Iraq), I published a review in the Los Angeles Times of the book that provides the data for the film Charlie Wilson's War.
The original edition of the book carried the subtitle, "The
Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History the
Arming of the Mujahideen." The 2007 paperbound edition was subtitled,
"The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue
CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times." Neither the claim that the
Afghan operations were covert nor that they changed history is
precisely true.
In my review of the book, I wrote,
"The
Central Intelligence Agency has an almost unblemished record of
screwing up every 'secret' armed intervention it ever undertook. From
the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953 through the rape of
Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs, the failed attempts to assassinate
Fidel Castro of Cuba and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, the Phoenix
Program in Vietnam, the 'secret war' in Laos, aid to the Greek Colonels
who seized power in 1967, the 1973 killing of President Allende in
Chile, and Ronald Reagan's Iran-Contra war against Nicaragua, there is
not a single instance in which the Agency's activities did not prove
acutely embarrassing to the United States and devastating to the people
being 'liberated.' The CIA continues to get away with this bungling
primarily because its budget and operations have always been secret and
Congress is normally too indifferent to its Constitutional functions to
rein in a rogue bureaucracy. Therefore the tale of a purported CIA
success story should be of some interest. "According to the author of Charlie Wilson's War, the
exception to CIA incompetence was the arming between 1979 and 1988 of
thousands of Afghan mujahideen ("freedom fighters"). The Agency flooded
Afghanistan with an incredible array of extremely dangerous weapons and
'unapologetically mov[ed] to equip and train cadres of high tech holy
warriors in the art of waging a war of urban terror against a modern
superpower [in this case, the USSR].'
"The author of this
glowing account, [the late] George Crile, was a veteran producer for
the CBS television news show '60 Minutes' and an exuberant Tom
Clancy-type enthusiast for the Afghan caper. He argues that the U.S.'s
clandestine involvement in Afghanistan was 'the largest and most
successful CIA operation in history,' 'the one morally unambiguous
crusade of our time,' and that 'there was nothing so romantic and
exciting as this war against the Evil Empire.' Crile's sole measure of
success is killed Soviet soldiers (about 15,000), which undermined
Soviet morale and contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union
in the period 1989 to 1991. That's the successful part.
"However, he never once mentions that the 'tens of thousands of
fanatical Muslim fundamentalists' the CIA armed are the same people who
in 1996 killed nineteen American airmen at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,
bombed our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, blew a hole in the
side of the U.S.S. Cole
in Aden Harbor in 2000, and on September 11, 2001, flew hijacked
airliners into New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon."
Where Did the "Freedom Fighters" Go?
When I wrote those words I did not know (and could not have imagined)
that the actor Tom Hanks had already purchased the rights to the book
to make into a film in which he would star as Charlie Wilson, with
Julia Roberts as his right-wing Texas girlfriend Joanne Herring, and
Philip Seymour Hoffman as Gust Avrakotos, the thuggish CIA operative
who helped pull off this caper.
What to make of the film (which I found rather boring and
old-fashioned)? It makes the U.S. government look like it is populated
by a bunch of whoring, drunken sleazebags, so in that sense it's
accurate enough. But there are a number of things both the book and the
film are suppressing. As I noted in 2003,
"For the CIA legally to carry out a
covert action, the president must sign off on that is, authorize a
document called a 'finding.' Crile repeatedly says that President
Carter signed such a finding ordering the CIA to provide covert backing
to the mujahideen after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on
December 24, 1979. The truth of the matter is that Carter signed the
finding on July 3, 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion,
and he did so on the advice of his national security adviser, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, in order to try to provoke a Russian incursion. Brzezinski
has confirmed this sequence of events in an interview with a French
newspaper, and former CIA Director [today Secretary of Defense] Robert
Gates says so explicitly in his 1996 memoirs. It may surprise Charlie
Wilson to learn that his heroic mujahideen were manipulated by
Washington like so much cannon fodder in order to give the USSR its own
Vietnam. The mujahideen did the job but as subsequent events have made
clear, they may not be all that grateful to the United States."
In the bound galleys of Crile's book, which his publisher sent to
reviewers before publication, there was no mention of any
qualifications to his portrait of Wilson as a hero and a patriot. Only
in an "epilogue" added to the printed book did Crile quote Wilson as
saying, "These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the
world. And the people who deserved the credit are the ones who made the
sacrifice. And then we fucked up the endgame." That's it. Full stop.
Director Mike Nichols, too, ends his movie with Wilson's final sentence
emblazoned across the screen. And then the credits roll.
Neither a reader of Crile, nor a viewer of the film based on his book
would know that, in talking about the Afghan freedom fighters of the
1980s, we are also talking about the militants of al Qaeda and the
Taliban of the 1990s and 2000s. Amid all the hoopla about Wilson's
going out of channels to engineer secret appropriations of millions of
dollars to the guerrillas, the reader or viewer would never suspect
that, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989,
President George H.W. Bush promptly lost interest in the place and
simply walked away, leaving it to descend into one of the most horrific
civil wars of modern times.
Among those supporting the Afghans (in addition to the U.S.) was the
rich, pious Saudi Arabian economist and civil engineer, Osama bin
Laden, whom we helped by building up his al Qaeda base at Khost. When
bin Laden and his colleagues decided to get even with us for having
been used, he had the support of much of the Islamic world. This
disaster was brought about by Wilson's and the CIA's incompetence as
well as their subversion of all the normal channels of political
oversight and democratic accountability within the U.S. government.
Charlie Wilson's war thus turned out to have been just another bloody
skirmish in the expansion and consolidation of the American empire
and an imperial presidency. The victors were the military-industrial
complex and our massive standing armies. The billion dollars' worth of
weapons Wilson secretly supplied to the guerrillas ended up being
turned on ourselves.
An Imperialist Comedy
Which brings us back to the movie and its reception here. (It has been
banned in Afghanistan.) One of the severe side effects of imperialism
in its advanced stages seems to be that it rots the brains of the
imperialists. They start believing that they are the bearers of
civilization, the bringers of light to "primitives" and "savages"
(largely so identified because of their resistance to being "liberated"
by us), the carriers of science and modernity to backward peoples,
beacons and guides for citizens of the "underdeveloped world."
Such attitudes are normally accompanied by a racist ideology that
proclaims the intrinsic superiority and right to rule of "white"
Caucasians. Innumerable European colonialists saw the hand of God in
Darwin's discovery of evolution, so long as it was understood that He
had programmed the outcome of evolution in favor of late Victorian
Englishmen. (For an excellent short book on this subject, check out
Sven Lindquist's "Exterminate All the Brutes.")
When imperialist activities produce unmentionable outcomes, such as
those well known to anyone paying attention to Afghanistan since about
1990, then ideological thinking kicks in. The horror story is
suppressed, or reinterpreted as something benign or ridiculous (a
"comedy"), or simply curtailed before the denouement becomes obvious.
Thus, for example, Melissa Roddy, a Los Angeles film-maker with inside
information from the Charlie Wilson production team, notes
Similarly, we are told by another insider
reviewer, James Rocchi, that the scenario, as originally written by
Aaron Sorkin of "West Wing" fame, included the following line for
Avrakotos: "Remember I said this: There's going to be a day when we're
gonna look back and say 'I'd give anything if [Afghanistan] were
overrun with Godless communists'." This line is nowhere to be found in the final film.
Today there is ample evidence that, when it comes to the freedom of
women, education levels, governmental services, relations among
different ethnic groups, and quality of life all were infinitely
better under the Afghan communists than under the Taliban or
the present government of President Hamid Karzai, which evidently
controls little beyond the country's capital, Kabul. But Americans
don't want to know that and certainly they get no indication of it
from Charlie Wilson's War, either the book or the film.
The tendency of imperialism to rot the brains of imperialists is
particularly on display in the recent spate of articles and reviews in
mainstream American newspapers about the film. For reasons not entirely
clear, an overwhelming majority of reviewers concluded that Charlie Wilson's War is a "feel-good comedy" (Lou Lumenick in the New York Post), a "high-living, hard-partying jihad" (A.O. Scott in the New York Times), "a sharp-edged, wickedly funny comedy" (Roger Ebert in the Chicago Sun-Times). Stephen Hunter in the Washington Post
wrote of "Mike Nichols's laff-a-minute chronicle of the congressman's
crusade to ram funding through the House Appropriations Committee to
supply arms to the Afghan mujahideen"; while, in a piece entitled "Sex!
Drugs! (and Maybe a Little War)," Richard L. Berke in the New York Times offered this stamp of approval:
"You can make a movie that is relevant and intelligent and palatable
to a mass audience if its political pills are sugar-coated."
When I saw the film, there was only a guffaw or two from the audience
over the raunchy sex and sexism of "good-time Charlie," but certainly
no laff-a-minute. The root of this approach to the film probably lies
with Tom Hanks himself, who, according to Berke, called it "a serious
comedy." A few reviews qualified their endorsement of Charlie Wilson's War, but still came down on the side of good old American fun. Rick Groen in the Toronto Globe and Mail, for instance, thought that it was "best to enjoy Charlie Wilson's War as a thoroughly engaging comedy. Just don't think about it too much or you may choke on your popcorn." Peter Rainer noted in the Christian Science Monitor that the "Comedic Charlie Wilson's War
has a tragic punch line." These reviewers were thundering along with
the herd while still trying to maintain a bit of self-respect.
The handful of truly critical reviews have come mostly from blogs and
little-known Hollywood fanzines with one major exception, Kenneth
Turan of the Los Angeles Times. In an essay subtitled
"'Charlie Wilson's War' celebrates events that came back to haunt
Americans," Turan called the film "an unintentionally sobering
narrative of American shouldn't-have" and added that it was "glib
rather than witty, one of those films that comes off as being more
pleased with itself than it has a right to be."
My own view is that if Charlie Wilson's War
is a comedy, it's the kind that goes over well with a roomful of louts
in a college fraternity house. Simply put, it is imperialist propaganda
and the tragedy is that four-and-a-half years after we invaded Iraq and
destroyed it, such dangerously misleading nonsense is still being
offered to a gullible public. The most accurate review so far is James
Rocchi's summing-up for Cinematical: "Charlie Wilson's War isn't just bad history; it feels even more malign, like a conscious attempt to induce amnesia."